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CORPORATIONS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY
ACT OF 1898.
In its application to corporate bodies, the Act of Congress of
July i, 1898, establishing a uniform system of bankruptcy,
differs in certain important features, both of policy and detail,
from the previous national laws on the same subject. It is the
purpose of the present article to indicate the more striking of
these peculiarities of the new act, and to discuss their probable
effect, in so far as that can be done in advance of authoritative
rulings of the courts on the interpretation of the statute.
In the first place, corporations were allowed to take the ben-
efit of the bankruptcy act of 1867 on their voluntary petition.
Such petition might be filed on behalf of the corporation by
"any officer of any such corporation or company duly authorized
by a vote of a majority of the corporators at any legal meeting
called for the purpose."* It is not so under the present law.
The fourth section of the act provides that "any person who
owes debts, except a corporation, shall be entitled to the bene-
fits of this act as a voluntary bankrupt." And in connection
with this provision should be read the declaration of the intro-
ductory section that "' corporations' shall mean all bodies
having any of the powers and privileges of private corpora-
tions not possessed by individuals or partnerships, and shall in-
clude limited or other partnership associations organized under
laws making the capital subscribed alone responsible for the
debts of the association." It is obvious that this definition per-
mits the voluntary bankruptcy of ordinary commercial partner-
* Rev. St. U. S. §5122.
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ships, but shuts out most forms of limited partnership, joint-
stock companies, and other forms of associated capital.
As all corporations are excluded from the voluntary features
of the act, so also many kinds of corporations are exempted
from compulsory proceedings under it. Involuntary proceed-
ings in bankruptcy may be taken against "any corporation
engaged principally in manufacturing, trading, printing, pub-
lishing, or mercantile pursuits, owing debts to the amount of
one thousand dollars or over. Private bankers, but not national
banks or banks incorporated under state or territorial laws,
may be adjudged involuntary bankrupts." * This provision is
much more restricted than the corresponding clause of the act
of 1867, which applied to all "moneyed, business, or commercial
corporations." Under that clause it was said that a corporation
carrying on and pursuing any lawful business, defined and
clothed by its charter with power to do so, was a "business cor-
poration" and amenable to the bankruptcy law; and that it was
the clear intent of the clause to bring within the scope of the
law all corporations, except those organized for religious, chari-
table, literary, educational, municipal, or political purposes.I
Hence, for example, the authority of a court of bankruptcy to
adjudicate a railroad company bankrupt and administer its
property under the act was fully established and not infre-
quently exercised.1 But such a corporation does not appear to
fall under any of the classes enumerated in the new act, unless
possibly it should be considered that its business was a "mer-
cantile pursuit," and even that construction would do violence
to the established use of language. To take another illustra-
tion, insurance companies were held to be subject to the com-
pulsory features of the act of 1867, as they are clearly "moneyed
or business" corporations. § Insurance companies do not man-
ufacture, print, or publish, as the principal part of their busi-
ness; and it is very doubtful whether their business could be
considered a "mercantile pursuit," within the true meaning and
intent of the law. On this point the courts must eventually de-
cide. There is but little direct authority. But we have a
decision that insurance is not "commerce," as that term is used
in the Constitution of the United States, 0 and numerous rulings
*Bankruptcy Act, 1898, §4, b.
tAlabama & C. R. Co. v. Jones, 5 N. B. R. 97.
t See New Orleans, S. F. & L. R. Co. v. Delamore, 114 U. S. 5o, and
other cases cited in Black, Bankruptcy, 30.
§ In re Merchants' Ins. Co., 3 Biss. 162.
Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Insurance Co. of North America v. Com-
monwealth, 87 Pa. St. 173.
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(presently to be cited) to the effect that a "merchant" is one
who buys and sells commodities. Religious societies, in the
United States, are almost invariably corporations, and hence
are not subject to the bankruptcy law. For, as corporations,
they cannot take advantage of it by a -voluntary petition, nor
can they be proceeded against in invitum, since they are not en-
gaged in "manufacturing, trading, printing, publishing, or mer-
cantile pursuits." But it seems that an association of persons
organized for religious or ecclesiastical purposes, but which has
not complied with the statutes of the state With respect to the
steps necessary to secure a corporate existence, might be pro-
ceeded against as an "unincorporated company," provided it
did not have "any of the powers and privileges of private cor-
porations not possessed by individuals or partnerships," and
owed debts to the amount of a thousand dollars.
As to this phrase, "unincorporated company," there is need
of careful discrimination. The fourth section of the act pro-
vides that "any natural person," except such as follow certain
enumerated pursuits, "any unincorporated company, and any
corporation engaged principally in manufacturing," etc., may
be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt. The introductory sec-
tion, as we have seen, makes the term "corporation" include
"limited or other partnership associations organized under laws
making the capital subscribed alone responsible for the debts
of the association." Now, if the word "corporation," in the
clause relating to involuntary bankruptcy, is to be taken
in this comprehensive sense, then, being contrasted with "un-
incorporated company," it will include, and "unincorporated
company," will not include, limited partnerships and joint-stock
associations. The effect of this reading will be that such part-
nerships and associations are not amenable to the law unless
pursuing one of the enumerated occupations, while any other.
form of unincorporated company is subject to the law without
reference to the nature of its business.*
Aside from printing and publishing companies, those cor-
porations which are made subject to the compulsory provisions
of the act are, as already stated, corporations engaged in "man-
ufacturing, trading, or mercantile pursuits." The term "trader"
is not new in bankruptcy law. In fact, at first, such laws were
*As to the nature of joint-stock companies and limited partnerships, with
particular reference to ihe question of their corporate existence, and to their
citizenship for purposes of Federal jurisdiction, see Chapman v. Barney, 129
U. S. 677; Carnegie v. Hulbert, 3 C. C. A. 39r, 53 Fed. Rep. io; Youngstown
Coke Co. v. Andrews Bros. Co.,, 79 Fed. Rep. 669, -
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restricted entirely to persons who answered to this description;
and even after their scope was enlarged, traders were required
to keep books of account, in order to be entitled to a discharge,
and in some other respects were distinguished from others sub-
ject to the law. The interpretation of the term, therefore, as
here used, should not occasion any special difficulty. The same
is true, in a measure, of the terms "merchant" and "mercantile
pursuits." But "manufacturer," as descriptive of a class of
persons amenable to be proceeded against in bankruptcy, is an
entirely novel designation. The courts, however, in putting a
construction upon this word, will not be entirely without prece-
dents to follow. In many of the states statutes have been
enacted which make special provision for the organization and
government of "manufacturing corporations," or impose special
liabilities upon their directors or stockholders, or exempt,
wholly or in part, their property from the ordinary burdens of
taxation. Upon the simple question whether or not a given
corporatiou comes within the class thus designated, decisions
rendered under these state statutes should be considered appli-
cable to the bankruptcy law, and while not binding on the
federal courts, will be of value as persuasive authorities.
And first, a merchant is "one who is engaged in the business
of buying commercial commodities and selling them again for
the sake of profit; especially one who buys and sells in quantity
or by wholesale. One who buys without selling again, or who
sells without having bought, as where one sells products of his
own labor, or who buys and sells exclusively articles not the
subject of ordinary commerce, or who buys and sells commercial
articles on salary and not for profit, is not usually termed a
merchant."* In the case of a merchant, as well as a manufac-
turer, there is the common element of purchasing personal
property, with a view of making a gain or profit. But a man-
ufacturer attains this object "by adding to the value of the
property after purchase, by some process or combination with
other materials, while the merchant is supposed to get his
advanced price or profit by selling the article as it is, without
subjecting it to any change by hand, by machinery, or by art.
The material entering into the manufactured article may be
modified more or less in its identity, as it passes through the
several stages of a manufacturing process; but the merchant
*Century Dict. voc. "Merchant." A merchant is one who buys to sell
again, and who does both, not occasionally or incidentally, but habitually and
as a business. Commonwealth v. Natural Gas Co., 32 Pittsb. Leg. J. 30o;
State v. Smith, 5 Humph. 393; Lansdale v. Brashear, 3 T. B. Mon. 330.
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deals in the manufactured article itself, or its constituents, by
buying and selling them in the same condition in which he
purchases them. His business is that of exchanges and not of
making or fabricating from raw materials."*
Proceeding now to specify examples of these questions, we
find decisions to the effect that the production of illuminating
gas, and supplying it to consumers, is a manufacture, and that
corporations organized for this purpose and engaged in this
business are "manufacturing companies."t Not so, however,
with natural gas. A company engaged in supplying natural
gas to customers for light and heat is not a manufacturing cor-
poration. Natural gas is "a product of nature, and not the
result of any manufacturing process." As to electric com-
panies, the decisions are squarely opposed. In Pennsylvania
and Maryland, it is held that a company generating electricity
and selling it to customers for power, illuminating, or heating
purposes, is not a manufacturing company,- within the mean-
ing of statutes exempting the capital stock of such companies
from taxation. § In New York, on the other hand, it is as decid-
edly held that such a corporation is within the terms of a simi-
lar statute. 1 In Pennsylvania, again, a corporation engaged
in supplying its tenants with steam power, to enable it the
more readily to rent its buildings and rooms, is not a manufac-
* Engle v. Sohn. 41 Ohio St. 69t. As to this distinction, see further Peo-
ple v. Roberts. go Hun. 533, 36 N. Y. Supp. 73; Eaton v. Walker, 76 Mich. 579,
43 N. W. Rep. 638.
f Nassau Gaslight Co. v. Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 409. But in Louisiana., t is
ruled that capital employed in the making of illuminating gas for street light-
ing is not within the terms of a statute which exempts from taxation capital
employed in the manufacture "of chemicals." Shreveport Gas Co. v. Asses-
sor, 47 La. Ann. 65, Ad South. Rep. 65o. And in Illinois gas companies are
not considered as manufacturing companies, because the statutes plainly dis-
tinguish between them. Ottawa Gaslight Co. v. Downey, 127 Ill. 201, 2o N. E.
Rep. 20.
t Emerson v. Commonwealth, io8 Pa. St. iii. And a company engaged
in producing or collecting natural gas from its own wells, and selling and dis-
tributing the same to customers, is not a "mercantile" corporation; because,
although it sells, it does not buy. Commonwealth v. Natural Gas Co., 32
Pittsb. Leg. J. 309.
§ Commonwealth v. Northern Electric Light and Power Co., 145 Pa. St.
1o, 22 At. Rep. 839; Commonwealth v. Edison Electric Light Co., 170 Pa.
St 231, 32 AtL Rep. 4x9; Frederick Electric L. & P. Co. v. Mayor of Fred-
erick, 84 Md. 599, 36 Atl. Rep. 362; Commonwealth v. Brush Electric Light
Co., 145 Pa. St. 147, 22 At. Rep. 844.
People v. Wemple, 129 N. Y. 543, 29 N. E. Rep. 8o8; People v. Camp-
bell, 88 Hun. 527.
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turer.* On the same principle which was held to determine the
case of natural gas, it has been ruled that hay is not a "manufac-
tured article." f As to natural ice, there is again a difference of
judicial opinion. In was very sensibly said by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts: "The cutting of ice produced
by the agencies of nature, on the surface of a pond, into pieces
of a size convenient for handling, and storing the pieces in a
building, cannot in any proper sense be called a manufacture.
The material is in no way changed or adapted to any new or
different use; it still remains ice, to be used simply as ice; it is
no more a manufacture than putting the water from the pond
into casks for transportation and use would be a manufacture." I
And a similar conclusion has been reached by the courts in
New York. § On the other hand, in Michigan, it is ruled that
the business of cutting natural ice from a river or lake and pre-
paring it for use as an article of consumption, by clearing it
from snow. and reducing it to blocks of a convenient size, is
manufacturing. 11 However this may be, it is clear that the pro-
duction of artificial ice by frigorific processes, as an article of
commerce, is within the description of "manufacturing." And
a corporation dealing in natural ice; though it may escape
liability to the bankruptcy law on the ground that its business
is not manufacturing, is certainly a "merchant," and therefore
subject to the law on that ground.** In this connection it may
be mentioned that an aqueduct company is not a "manufac-
turing" corporation, although it purifies the water before dis-
-tributing it, by means of filters and screens.t The business of
slaughtering cattle and refrigerating the carcasses and ship-
ping them to points for sale is not manufacturing;.1 though it
seems that a company which buys and slaughters hogs, and
subjects them to certain processes and combinations with other
materials, requiring the application of skill, labor and capital,
and converts them into lard and cured meats, for the purpose
*Commonwealth v. Arrott Steam-Power Mills Co., 145 Pa. St. 69, 22 Atl.
Rep. 243.
f Frazee v. Moffitt, 20 Blatchf. 267, 18 Fed. Rep. 584.
t Hittinger v. Westford, 135 Mass. 258.
§ People v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 99 N. Y. 181.
I Attorney-General v. Lorman,.59 Mich. 157.
People v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 99 N.Y. i81. Compare Greenville Ice
Co. v. Greenville, 69 Miss. 86.
** Kansas City v. Vindquest, 36 Mo. App. 584.
f Dudley v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., ioo Mass. 183.
#1 People v. Roberts, 155 N. Y. 408, 50 N. E. Rep. 53.
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of adding to the value thereof, with a view of making gain or
profit, is engaged in "manufacturing."*
The processes of extracting coal or mineral ores from the
earth, and of smelting, reducing, and refining such ores, or
breaking up and grading the coal, and of extracting slate or
other stone from quarries, are not processes of manufacture;
companies engaged in this business are mining companies, not
manufacturing corporations.f But it appears that a corporation
owning a quarry from which it takes slate and works it up into
sizes and shapes desired, may be so far considered a manufac-
turing company as to be able to claim exemption from taxation
on that part of its capital which is engaged in this part of its
business. I And working fire clay into fire brick, tiles, and such
other articles as are usually made of it, is manufacturing. § So
also is the business of "refining and preparing for use oil, coal,
and other minerals." 0 The business of converting trees and logs
into marketable lumber, in a sawmill, is not- manufacturing;
though it seems that a corporation whose business is the pro-
duction of kindling-wood from slabs, by the use of machinery,
skill, capital and labor, which article is different in form and
condition from the material out of which it is made, being
specially prepared for use as a kindler for anthracite coal, and
known under a distinctive name, is engaged in the business of
"manufacturing," within the meaning of the revenue law.**
On the other hand, in Louisiana, it is held that a planing-mill,
engaged in dressing rough lumber into plain and tongued and
grooved weatherboarding, flooring, and ceiling, and also in
making mouldings, door and window casings, baseboards, and
wainscoting, is not a manufacturing concern entitled to exemp-
tion from taxation. ft But a corporation which buys lumber,
*Engle v. Sohn, 41 Ohio St. 691. And a pork-packer is a "merchant;"
and it is immaterial that his labor changed the form of the goods sold. State
v. Whittaker, 33 Mo. 457; In re Bassett, 8 Fed. Rep. 266.
tHorn Silver Min. Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 3o5; Commonwealth v.
Lackawanna Iron Co., 129 Pa. St. 346; People v. Horn Silver Min. Co., o5-N.
Y. 76; Byers v. Franklin Coal Co., xo6 Mass. 131.
t Commonwealth v. East Bangor Slate Co., 162 Pa. St. 599, ig AUt.
Rep. 706.
§Commonwealth v. Savage Fire Brick Co., 257 Pa. "St 512; 27 AUt.
Rep. 374.
I Hawes v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co., iox Mass. 385.
TJones v. Raines, 35 La. Ann. 996.
**People v. Roberts, 2oApp. Div. (N. Y.) 514. Compare Correio v. Lynch,
65 Cal. 273.
StWhited v. Bledsoe, 49 La. Ann. 325, 21 South. Rep. 538.
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iron, and other materials in the rough, and at its own shops
finishes, shapes, designs, and makes such materials suitable for
use, and puts the same together in the erection of bridges,
roofs, and other structures, is a manufacturing corporation.*
So also is a company operating a steam flouring-mill,t but not a
grain-elevator company, engaged in buying, selling, and stor-
ing grain, building and operating grain warehouses, and inci-
dentally dealing in coal, lime, and cement. A book-binder
who also makes blank books is (in Connecticut) a manufac-
turer, § but not (in Louisiana) one who prints bill-heads, orders,
and other forms for commercial purposes, on paper bought by
him, and who cuts and folds the paper into shapes for such pur-
poses, as well as to serve for ledgers and other commercial
books. I A corporation engaged in mixing teas, and in roast-
ing, grinding and mixing coffee, is not a manufacturing corpo-
ration. Nor is the making of soda, vichy, seltzer, and similar
drinks, a "manufacture of chemicals," within a statute grant-
ing exemption from taxation.*:' But the building and construc-
tion of locomotive engines is manufacturing, and not the less
so because a portion of the materials used in the construction
of the engines are bought by the manufacturers in such a state
of progress as to be adapted to the purpose designed with less
labor than the raw material would require.tt
As to the commission of acts of bankruptcy, upon which
involuntary proceedings may be founded, the law makes no dis-
tinction between corporations and natural persons. Each of
the five acts of bankruptcy enumerated in the statute can be as
well committed by a corporate body as by an individual.
Although the present statute gives the debtor much greater
latitude in managing his affairs than was accorded by previous
laws, and greatly restricts the number and character of the
causes for which he may be thrown into bankruptcy, it is' not
within our present purpose to discuss these differences, as they
do not peculiarly affect corporations. It should be remarked,
however, that in every case actual insolvency at the time of
*Commonwealth v. Keystone Bridge Co., 156 Pa. St. 5oo, 27 Ad. Rep. x.
f Carlin v. Western Assur. Co., 57 Md. 515.
: Mohr v. Minnesota Elevator Co., 4o Minn. 343.
§ Seeley v. Gwillim, 40 Conn., io6.
Patterson v. New Orleans, 47 La. Ann. 275, 16 South. Rep. 815.
People v. Roberts, i45 N. Y. 375, 40 N. E. Rep. 7.
** Crescent City Seltz & M. W. Co. v. New Orleans, 48 La. Ann. 768, i9
South. Rep. 943.
if Norris v. Commonwealth, 27 Pa. St. 494.
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filing the petition is an essential. An insolvency does not now, as
under former statutes, mean "inability to pay debts and meet
engagements as they mature in the ordinary course of busi-
ness." Congress has given an official definition to this term in the
following words: "A person shall be deemed insolvent, within
the provisions of this act, whenever the aggregate of his prop-
erty exclusive of any property which he may have conveyed,
transferred, concealed, or removed, or permitted to be concealed
or removed, with intent to defraud, hinder, or delay his credit-
ors, shall not, at a fair valuation, be sufficient in amount to pay
his debts." Moreover, the petition must be filed within four
months after the commission of the act of bankruptcy.* One
who is insolvent, it is said, and who undertakes to make a final
distribution of his assets, must do it through the court of bank-
ruptcy. A trust to sell all the debtor's property and divide the
proceeds ratably among his creditors is an act of bankruptcy.
But a mortgage by a railroad company to secure all its creditors
equally out of its earnings, and to pay such as refuse the
security their ratable proportion of the proceeds, is not an act
of bankruptcy.t Where a petition in bankruptcy is filed against
a corporation, it is not necessary, in order to authorize counsel
to appear and admit the acts of bankruptcy charged, that the
corporators or shareholders should previously, by a vote,
authorize that act or direct it to be done.1
In regard to the jurisdiction of the courts of bankruptcy over
the person of the debtor, the terms of the act are very broad.
They have authority to pass an adjudication in bankruptcy
against persons (including corporations) "who have had their
principal place of business, resided, or had their do micile,
within their respective territorial jurisdictions for the preced-
ing six months or the greater portion thereof."§ The residence
or domicile of a corporation, it is now reasonably well settled,
can be only in the state from which it derives its charter or
under whose laws it was organized. But it will be perceived
that the terms of the law are wide enough to cover the case of
a corporation organized in one state but transacting all- its busi-
ness in another. Jurisdiction in bankruptcy over such a com-
pany would belong to the federal district court in the district
where its principal office was maintained -and. the principal
Bankruptcy Act, a898, §3; Id. §i, clause 15.
t In re Union Pac. R. Co., io N. B. R. 178.
t Leiter v. Payson, 9 N. B. R. 205.
§ Bankruptcy Act, I898, §2, clause x.
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volume of its business transacted (for the preceding six
months), without reference to the question of its "citizenship"
in the same or another state. Where the same corporation
enjoys a corporate existence by legislative recognition in two
or more states at once, and successive petitions in bankruptcy
are filed against it in the federal courts within each of those
states, that court which first acquires jurisdiction, by the filing
of a petition, will retain it, and must be permitted to exercise
it to the fullest extent, without interference by any other
court.*
It is also important to be noticed, in this relation, that a cor-
poration, subject to the provisions of the act, which has com-
mitted an act of bankruptcy, and is in existence when the
petition against it is filed, and when the proper papers are
served on its officers, cannot oust the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court to proceed at the proper time to an adjudication,
because a decree dissolving the corporation has been made
after such service and before the return day.t And it is even
held that the federal court has power to declare a corporation
bankrupt notwithstanding its dissolution by decree of a state
court before the institution of proceedings in bankruptcy, pro-
vided that such proceedings are commenced within six months
(now four) after such dissolution, that being the time within
which an act of bankruptcy must be alleged.1
But supposing the corporation to remain in existence until
it passes under the control of a court of bankruptcy, the inter-
esting question arises whether or not it is dissolved by the adju-
dication in bankruptcy. On this point the authorities are not
in harmony. On the one hand, it has been said that a corpora-
tion, for all essential purposes, is as effectually dissolved by the
commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy as if a solemn
judgment were pronounced to that effect. It is such a disso-
lution, it is said, as will afford creditors a remedy against the
individual shareholders where they are made liable upon the
"dissolution" of the company. § And a federal court has
declared that, under a state statute providing that upon
the "dissolution" of a corporation its president and direct-
* In re Boston, H. & E. R. Co., 9 Blatchf. ioi.
f Platt v. Archer, 9 Blatchf. 559.
t In re New Amsterdam Ins. Co., 6 Bened. 368; In re Independent Ins.
Co., 6 N. B. R. 260; Thornhil v. Bank of Louisiana, i Woods z.
§ State Savings Ass'n v. Kellogg, 52 Mo. 583. And see Slee v. Bloom, i9
Johns. 456; Penniman v. Briggs, Hopk. (N. Y.) Ch. 3oo; In re Washington
Marine Ins. Co., 2 Bened. 292.
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ors or managers shall be. in law trustees for the set-
tlement of its affairs and personally responsible to
creditors to the extent of the property which may come to
their hands, the mere insolvency of the concern, known to the
president and directors, works a practical dissolution, so as to
impose upon them the statutory consequences.* But there is
strong authority the other way. The adjudication in bank-
ruptcy, it is argued, does not necessarily destroy the life of the
corporation any more than that of a natural person. It is true
the bankrupt, while under the control of the court, is said to
be civiliter mortmus; and of course all corporate functions, or at
least all control of the business of the corporation, must be
regarded as suspended during the continuance of the proceed-
ings in bankruptcy. But there is nothing in the'language of
the act, nor in the necessary consequences of such a proceeding,
to prevent the corporation from resuming its business and the
exercise of all its corporate functions, after it shall have ob-
tained a discharge; and so long as that is possible, it cannot
with any propriety be said that the company is dissolved.t
This view has been picturesquely expressed by the court in
Georgia in the following terms: "The bankruptcy of a corpora-
tion does not put an and to its corporate existence nor vacate
the office of its directors. A corporation of this state cannot
be dissolved by an Act of Congress, nor by the administration
thereof through the federal courts. Georgia created, and she
alone can destroy. Besides. it is not the purpose of the bank-
rupt law to dissolve corporations. The assets are seized, but
the franchise is spared. ' Your money,' not 'your life,' is the
demand made by the bankrupt act." I The same view has been
maintained by eminent courts in considering the effect of pro-
cedings under the state insolvency laws upon the existence of
corporations. "There is nothing in the proceedings to prevent
their continuing to accomplish the end and purpose of their
existence, at least until their franchise, or the right to act as a
corporation, is sold under one of the provisions of the statute,
if indeed such sale would have the effect. The corporation
notwithstanding the proceedings in insolvency, may have
assets sufficient to pay all their debts, and then no impediment
* Sprague-Brimmer Manufacturing Co. v. Murphy Furnishing Goods Co.,
26 Fed. Rep. 572.
tMorley v. Thayer, 3 Fed. Rep. 737.
tHolland v. Heyman, 6o Ga. 174. And see Chamberlin v. Hugenot Manu-
facturing Co., 118 Mass. 532; Shenandoah Valley R. Co. v. Griffith, 76 Va. 913;
2 Morawetz, Corps. §ioio.
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would exist, before a surrender pursuant to law or a forfeiture
ascertained and declared by a proper judicial proceeding, fromi
resuming their business. Or if their capital is impaired or
wholly gone, this seems to be no reason, before such surrender
or forfeiture, to prevent the members fror furnishing renewed
capital and then proceeding to use their corporate powers."*
As to the administration of the estate in bankruptcy, there
are but few particulars in which proceedings against a corpora-
tion differ from those against a natural person. It is held, how-
ever, that the trustee in bankruptcy has all the authority of a
receiver to collect demands and pay debts, and, under the order
of the court appointing him, an assessment may be made on
the unpaid shares of stock in the bankruptcy corporation, just
as if the same had been ordered by the corporation itself be-
fore bankruptcy.t Moreover, the bankruptcy of a corporation
does not prevent judgment being obtained against the corpora-
tion (unless the court of bankruptcy should see fit, for sufficient
reasons, to enjoin the prosecution of the action); and the cred-
itor, in default of obtaining satisfaction under the judgment
from the property of the corporation, may pursue his statutory
remedy against the stockholder.t But a stockholder indebted
to the bankrupt corporation for unpaid shares cannot set off
against this debt (which is a trust fund for creditors) a debt
due him by the corporation. The fund arising from such
unpaid shares must be equally divided among all the creditors. §
Is the franchise by which a corporation exists property
which will vest in its trustee in bankruptcy, and which may be
sold by him in the administration of his trust? It appears
that the act of 1867 contemplated an affirmative answer to this
question. For No. XXI of the General Orders framed under
that act provided that, "In making sale of the franchise of a
corporation, it may be offered in fractional parts or in certain
numbers of shares corresponding to the number of shares in
the bankrupt corporation." There is no such provision in the
present statute nor in the new General Orders. But it is
enacted that the trustee in bankruptcy shall be vested, by
operation of law, with the title of the bankrupt to "property
which, prior to the filing of the petition, he could by any
*Coburn v. Boston Papier Mache Manufacturing Co., io Gray 243; Bos-
ton Glass Manufactory v. Langdon, 24 Pick. 49.
t Upton v. Hansbrough, 3 Biss. 417; Myers v. Seeley, io N. B. R. 4x;
Sanger v. Upton, 91 U. S. 56; Payson v. Stoever, 2 Dill. 427.
$Allen v. Ward, ioN. B. R. 285.
§ Sawyer v. Hoag, i7 Wall. 61o.
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means have transferred or which might have been levied upon
and sold under judicial process against him." And "transfer,"
according to the definitions given in the first section of the law,
"shall include the sale and every other and different mode of
disposing of or parting with property, or the possession of
property, absolutely or conditionally, as a payment, pledge,
mortgage, gift, or security." Now it is a general rule, settled
by the preponderance of authority, that a corporation cannot
mortgage, sell, or otherwise alienate its franchises, particularly
the franchise of corporate existence, unless power to do so has
been expressly conferred upon it; and consequently, that such
franchises are not subject to levy and sale on execution to
satisfy the debts of the corporation. But this rule will be
found to have been established, and to be almost exclusively
applied to the case of such corporations as have duties to ful-
fill, or services to render, towards the public, where the reason
of it is very apparent. As to corporations of this kind, they
are not subject to the operation of the present bankruptcy act;
and as to corporations of other kinds, it is almost universally
the case that their franchises, as such, have little or no pecu-
niary value. Where, however, such a corporation has authority
to mortgage or sell its franchises, they would seem to come
clearly within the description, of property vesting in the
trustee under the bankruptcy law.
The former bankruptcy law did not allow the granting of a
discharge, under any circumstances, to a bankrupt corporation.*
And as a consequence of this, it was held that the provision of
the statute for staying any pending suit or proceeding against
the bankrupt, to await the determination of the court in bank-
ruptcy on the question of discharge, did not apply to the case
of a corporation,t and that the act of a creditor in proving his
debt and recovering dividends and bankruptcy proceedings
against a corporation was no bar to his recovering judgment
for the balance in a state court.1 But this appears to be changed
by the present statute. It is enacted (§14) that "any person"
who has been adjudged a bankrupt "may file an application
for a discharge in the court of bankruptcy in which the pro-
ceedings are pending." And the first section of the law pro-
*" No allowance or discharge shall be granted to any corporation or joint-
stock company, or to any person or officer or member thereof." Rev. St.
U. S. 5122.
t Meyer v. Aurora Insurance Co., 7 N. B. R. 191.
t Ansonia Brass and Copper Co. v. New Lamp-Chimney Co.. 53 N. Y. 123,
io N. B. R. 355.
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vides that the word "person," as used in the act, "shall include
corporations, except where otherwise specified." In the absence
of any provision in the law, necessarily making the discharge
of a corporation impossible or inconsistent with the act, the
irresistible inference from the clauses quoted is that a corpora-
tion which has been thrown into bankruptcy may have its dis-
charge on the same conditions, and attended with the same
consequences, as in the case of any natural person.
H. CAMPBELL BLACK.
WASHINGTON, D. C.
